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When the Swedish philosopher, ToƌďjöƌŶ TäŶŶsjö asked ͞If seǆual disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ is oďjeĐtioŶaďle iŶ 
ŵost otheƌ aƌeas of ouƌ liǀes, ǁhǇ should it ďe aĐĐeptaďle ǁithiŶ spoƌts?͟ he ǁasŶ͛t ƌefeƌƌiŶg to the 
faĐt that ǁoŵeŶ͛s spoƌts ƌeĐeiǀes oŶlǇ 7% of all spoƌts Đoǀeƌage iŶ the UK aŶd oŶlǇ Ϯ% of national 
Ŷeǁspapeƌ Đoǀeƌage. He ǁasŶ͛t ƌefeƌƌiŶg to the peƌǀasiǀe seǆist attitudes that foĐus oŶ the phǇsiĐal 
attƌaĐtiǀeŶess of feŵale athletes aŶd ǁhat theǇ aƌe ;oƌ aƌeŶ͛tͿ ǁeaƌiŶg, ƌatheƌ thaŶ theiƌ phǇsiĐallǇ 
skilful accomplishments. Tännsjö was being rather more provocative, and deliberately so. His 
argument centred around the notion of equality: if women and men are to be treated equally and 
afforded equal opportunity, then there is no reason why sport should be separated according to sex. 
The obvious retort however is based around the concept of fairness, and generalisations about the 
physiological differences between men and women. It is scientifically demonstrated that men are 
generally stronger and faster than women and therefore sport, which predominantly measures 
strength and speed, should be differentiated accordingly. As such, separating sport into male and 
female categories is equivalent to separating sport into other categories such as weight and age. All 
stem from a desire to ensure sport is faiƌ aŶd to pƌeseƌǀe ǁhat WaƌƌeŶ Fƌaleigh ĐoiŶed ͚the sǁeet 
teŶsioŶ of uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ of outĐoŵe͛. Good spoƌt, oŶ this aĐĐouŶt, is ǁheŶ ĐoŵpetitioŶ is stƌuĐtuƌed 
to accurately test and measure the physical capacities of those involved and this is best done 
through mutually equal contests. A contest that pitches the skills of a demonstrably weaker 
opponent against a demonstrably stronger one is both unfair, and in some cases, reckless. For 
instance, no-one would argue that it is fair for an 18 stone male in his early 20s to fight against a six-
year-old child in a boxing match. Even the thought of such a contest is abhorrent. Not only is the 
young child likelǇ to suffeƌ seǀeƌe iŶjuƌǇ ďut it also ǁouldŶ͛t ďe a ǁoƌthǁhile spoƌtiŶg speĐtaĐle. We, 
as spectators, want to see sport whereby the outcome is unpredictable. The best sporting contests 
are those where all competitors must be at the top of their game in order to achieve victory; and 
where success is finely balanced. Fair sport is created by separating contests according to relevant 
criteria. 
The problem however, is in determining what the relevant criteria are. Combat sports such as 
boxing, judo, wrestling and taekwondo, and strength sports such as powerlifting, are all separated 
into different weight categories on the basis that the weight of the competitor is a key and relevant 
factor in determining the outcome. Similarly, most sports are also separated into age categories up 
to early adulthood (usually a range between 17 – 23 years) and then later into veterans (usually a 
range between 35 years and upwards). Again, age is considered a relevant characteristic in 
determining outcome. Following this argument then, it is fair to separate sport according to sex 
because sex is a relevant characteristic in the outcome of sporting competition. 
There are two problems with this account however. The first is whether sex is a relevant category in 
sporting contests and the second is with the concept of sex itself. As noted earlier, the idea that 
sport should be separated according to sex is based on the generalisation that most men are 
physically stronger and faster than most women. It is founded on the concept of normal or Gaussian 
distribution. Yet the problem with generalisation is that there will always be instances that do not 
ĐoŶfoƌŵ to the ͚Ŷoƌŵ͛. Whilst it ŵight ďe the Đase that oŶ the ďasis of phǇsiologiĐal poteŶtial, most 
men will be able to outperform most women in tests of raw strength and speed, there will be cases 
where a few women will be able to outperform most, and perhaps all, men. For these individuals, 
they should not be penalised from doing so on the basis of their sex. This argument has formed the 
basis of repealing the ban on female front-line service in the military by many countries. If a woman 
is able to carry out the required tasks for front-line service, then they should be allowed to do so. If 
we wish sport to be an equal but fair test then these exceptional women should be not be limited in 
their competition on the basis of their sex. Indeed, the same argument can be made in respect of 
weight and age too. On this argument, fairness of competition should be dependent on individual 
skill level and ability. As Aristotle noted, equals must be treated equally and unequals must be 
treated unequally. An illustration of the way in which generalisation can treat unequals equally can 
be provided from ͚sĐhoolďoǇ ƌugďǇ͛ ǁhiĐh is diǀided aloŶg liŶes of age, aŶd fƌeƋueŶtlǇ sees ďoǇs 
who have developed early into adolescence pitted against those that still have the build of a child. 
Critics of this approach say that it is therefore unsurprising that so many children are discouraged 
from the sport. It also skews the game from what should be a test of a whole range of skills and 
abilities towards a single test of brute strength that will not last. Larger children have no need to 
develop other rugby related skills when they can just run through their smaller class mates. These 
children then struggle to adapt when everyone else catches up with them and they no longer have 
their size advantage. The solution is to enable equals to play equals. In the same way that leagues 
allow each team or individual to find their natural level of competition and play worthwhile matches 
against similar players, sport should follow this structure more widely and competitions should not 
be constrained by definitive categories that are based upon generalisations. 
So whilst separation according to sex is based on the assumption that sports are inherently a test of 
the physiological characteristics of strength and speed it may be more accurate to say that sport is a 
test of physical skill. On this basis, though there may be physiological factors which contribute to the 
outcome, it is the acquisition and demonstration of skill that is the primary factor. And if skill is 
defined, as Cesar Torres suggests, as ͞acquired, intentional, and purposeful capacities to negotiate 
solutioŶs to pƌoďleŵatiĐ situatioŶs͟ then there is no evidence to suggest that one sex has an innate 
genetic or physiological advantage in this over the other. In which case, there is no basis for 
segregation according to sex. Indeed, much of the evidence seems to suggest that any differences in 
skill level between men and women is predominately driven by external or environmental factors. 
Social expectations about differences in the interests and the normal behaviour of boys and girls 
result in boys being encouraged and given greater opportunities to practice and develop their skill in 
sport, whilst the opposite is true foƌ giƌls. CoŵŵoŶlǇ used aǆioŵs suĐh as ͚ďoǇs ǁill ďe ďoǇs͛ aŶd 
͚fƌagile little giƌls͛ eǆeŵplifǇ the attitudes held toǁaƌds seǆ diffeƌeŶĐes. The ƌeĐeŶt #ThisGiƌlCaŶ aŶd 
#LikeAGirl initiatives are designed to challenge and change beliefs and stereotypes around physical 
aĐtiǀitǇ aŶd the faĐt that ǁoŵeŶ ĐaŶ͛t do sport, or at least ĐaŶ͛t do it as ǁell as ŵeŶ, so may as well 
not bother at all. If differences in physical skill are predominately environmental and not innate, as 
eǀideŶĐe ďǇ the ͚ϭϬ,ϬϬϬ houƌ͛ theoƌy which suggests anyone can become highly skilful if they put in 
sufficient practice, then separating sport on the basis of an incorrect assumption about the natural 
capacities of one sex compared to the other only compounds and exacerbates this problem. Indeed, 
in the same way as is demonstrated in other areas of the workplace, that for women to succeed at 
the top they need to surpass the achievements of men in order for their skills and attributes to be 
recognised, at the elite level of many sports, commentators note that women often demonstrate a 
higher level of skill than is expected as a means of compensating for any limitations in strength or 
speed. 
Separating sport on the basis of sex suffers a further, more conceptual, problem. Most sporting 
competitions operate on a sex binary line: males compete against males whilst females compete 
against females. There are exceptions such as equestrianism and wheelchair rugby although these 
are few and far between. And whilst one might expect shooting events to be mixed, since the ability 
to fire a pistol accurately over 10m, for example, is not dependent on strength or speed, these too 
aƌe seǆ segƌegated. Peƌhaps ƌatheƌ telliŶglǇ, it ǁasŶ͛t alǁaǇs the Đase. The spoƌt of skeet shootiŶg 
used to be a mixed competition until after the 1992 Olympic Games when the Chinese female 
competitor, Zhang Shan, won gold, when it suddenly became sex segregated. Clearly the authorities 
felt it was unfair on weak male competitors that they were forced to compete against stronger 
females. Joking aside, this incident illustrates what might be considered one of the less credible 
reasons Tännsjö outlines for the segregation of sports; that it damages male pride when they lose to 
women and has the potential to result in violent outbursts. 
The conceptual problem with delineating sport along lines of sex is that binary categories might not 
work for all. Whilst the majority of people may be happy to assign themselves and others to the 
laďel ͚ŵale͛ oƌ ͚feŵale͛, theƌe aƌe soŵe foƌ ǁhoŵ the laďels do Ŷot fit. Eitheƌ the teƌŵs ͚ŵale͛ oƌ 
͚feŵale͛ aƌe iŶappƌopƌiate, oƌ ŵoƌe ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ, the laďel ǁhiĐh theǇ Đhoose is Ŷot aĐĐepted ďǇ 
others. Due to fears over men posing as women and therefore cheating in sporting competitions, sex 
testing has been long regarded as an important deterrent. It was first made mandatory in 1950 
before the European Athletic Championships, following years of ongoing speculation and 
aĐĐusatioŶs that ŵeŶ ǁeƌe eŶteƌiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s athletiĐ eǀeŶts, and continued until the IAAF stopped 
testing in 1991 and the IOC ended it in 2000. In 2012, the International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) announced that they wished to bring back wider sex testing and advocated the 
use of a chart that visually depicted suspect physical characteristics based on a method formulated 
in the early 1960s. This move was highly controversial and was regarded as crude, severely flawed 
and insensitive. Following an appeal by Indian runner Dutee Chand, the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) ruled that the IAAF suspend its regulations on sex testing until they provided credible scientific 
evidence that levels of testosterone had a direct and quantifiable relationship to athletic 
performance. As of yet, the IAAF has not provided any evidence and is unlikely to do so. Note that it 
is only women that are sex tested, and accusations of sex-cheating are directed towards only those 
women that do not conform to a particular feminine stereotype. No-one has ever accused Maria 
“haƌapoǀa of Ŷot ďeiŶg a ͚ƌeal͛ ǁoŵaŶ. 
The conceptual problem with sex testing is that there is no single conclusive way of determining sex. 
Early tests focused on the external examination of genitalia and later tests used chromosomes, 
genes, and more recently testosterone, as used by the IAAF. None of these methods are conclusive 
and may produce conflicting evidence. Sex, ultimately, is non-determinate which is a problem for 
sport that is divided along those lines. 
Similar problems exist in sport for those who reject the sex they are assigned with at birth. In 2004, 
UK Government legislation was passed to prohibit discrimination against transsexual or transgender 
persons but exceptions were made to the sphere of sport whereby it was decided that individual 
Governing Bodies were best placed to determine who was eligible to compete in sex categories. One 
consequence of this however is a disparity between UK law and Governing Body guidelines that has 
the potential to lead to absurd consequences. As such, it is possible that an athlete may have a legal 
status as one sex but forced to compete in events against the other. 
Questions about sex segregation in sports are complex and needs to be understood in relation to 
wider issues about the way we construct and conceive of sex and gender differences in society. That 
seǆ aŶd geŶdeƌ aƌe Đoƌe ĐoŵpoŶeŶts of aŶ iŶdiǀidual͛s ideŶtitǇ ŵeaŶs that aŶǇ doubts raised about 
the sex of an individual athlete will undoubtedly strike at the heart of a sensitive issue. The problem 
it seems is the way in which sport is inflexible in the way it is constructed and on the flawed 
assumption that sport is predominately a celebration of masculine values possessed by men. 
Women have little place in it and if they must compete, it is at the lower end of the elite spectrum, 
unless of course, they are demonstrating feminine values of grace, beauty and suppleness, 
exemplified by sports such as gymnastics or synchronised swimming: minor diversions from the 
more serious sports of football, rugby or athletics. 
The answer then is to abandon sex segregation altogether. The best women will be able to hone and 
demonstrate their talent by competing against others with whom they are equal and there would be 
no concern over someone pretending to be the sex they are not. Many would resist such moves on 
the basis that it is difficult enough to get women to participate in sport in the first place without 
them being demotivated by overly-competitive and pride-fuelled men determined to prove their 
superiority. Similarly, if sex segregation were to disappear at an instant, there would be few women 
left aďle to paƌtiĐipate at the elite leǀel. AdǀoĐates foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s spoƌt aƌgue that it is oŶlǇ very 
recently that small gains have been made in the professioŶalizatioŶ aŶd spoŶsoƌship of ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
sport that enable a few women to make a living from playing sport. The removal of sex categories 
would completely eradicate the visibility of female athletes which would only compound the 
difficulties of female grass-roots participation. 
Accepting such concerns, the solution may be to set the ultimate goal of removing sex segregation in 
sport and to ensure that competition is based on quantifiable performance differences at an 
individual level not a wider generalisation. But this would require greater societal change in regard 
to expectations about female ability and sporting potential. In the meantime, there should be 
opportunity for women to compete with and against men if they choose to do so. A fair assessment 
of skill level and a just opportunity to progress is required rather than a limitation imposed on an 
individual by recourse to fixed and inflexible categories such as sex. Sport needs to be constructed in 
a way that provides good competition for all those involved in it. In this Tännsjö is right in arguing 
that segregation according to sex cannot be the answer when it has been rejected in all other 
aspects of modern life. 
